No. 48378-5-II

COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION II
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

PIERCE COUNTY et al, RESPONDENTS

v.

DONNA ZINK, APPELLANT

RESPONSIVE BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

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I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves psychological evaluations performed by certified health care professionals under the Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA) law and the Special Sex Offender Sentencing Disposition Alternative (SSODA) law.

SSOSA and SSODA evaluations determine whether certain first-time sex offenders are amenable to treatment and thus whether they may receive a suspended sentence with intensive clinical treatment and supervision. *See* RCW 9.94A.670(2)-(6). To complete the evaluation the health care professional must examine the patient's psychosexual history and condition, and assess the offender's relative risk factors and amenability to treatment. RCW 9.94A.670(3)(a)-(b); WAC 246-930-230(2)(d)-(f). If the offender is deemed amenable to treatment the professional must also include a detailed treatment plan.[1] RCW 9.94A.670(3)(b); WAC 246-930-230(2)(g).

SSOSA and SSODA evaluations include intimate details about the person's entire life, such as past sexual partners and the details of their sexual activities. But the evaluations do not just contain sensitive

[1] SSODAs are similar to SSOSAs but designed for juvenile youth. Juveniles facing a first-time conviction for certain sex offenses in Washington may seek a clement to traditional sentencing—i.e., a SSODA. See RCW 13.40.162. If a juvenile is SSODA eligible, the court may order an evaluation to determine the offender's amenability to treatment. *Id.*

information about the offenders themselves, they also contain sensitive information about the person's spouse, significant other, and/or family members. In addition, the victim's identity will often be obvious from a SSOSA or SSODA evaluation; disclosure of the SSOSA evaluation will thus disclose their identity and re-traumatize them.

In this case, Appellant Donna Zink asked Pierce County to release all SSOSA and SSODA evaluations in its possession, invoking the Public Records Act (PRA). The PRA promotes disclosure and government transparency. But it also contains exemptions to disclosure. This case involves one of those exemptions—the one that applies to the public inspection and copying of "health care information." *See* RCW 42.56.360(2) ("health care information of patients" under RCW 70.02 is exempt from disclosure under the PRA). The trial court enjoined Pierce County from the blanket release of SSOSA and SSODA evaluations based on this exemption. This was the correct ruling.

RCW 70.02, the Uniform Health Care Information Act (UHCIA) exempts SSOSA and SSODA evaluations from disclosure because they contain identifiable patient health care information. By law, only licensed health care professionals can perform SSOSA and SSODA evaluations, and those professionals conduct SSOSA and SSODA evaluations in the same manner as they would any other evaluation of a patient seeking

mental health treatment. The document resulting from these clinical evaluations contains both a comprehensive psychological assessment and a detailed health care treatment plan. If SSOSA and SSODA evaluations are not protected under RCW 70.02, it is difficult to imagine what medical information could be except from the PRA.

SSODA evaluations are also exempt from disclosure under RCW 13.50, because they are juvenile records that are not part of the juvenile court file and are thus confidential.

The trial court was correct in enjoining the release of SSOSA and SSODA evaluations under RCW 42.56.540, the provision of the PRA authorizing injunctions against disclosure. The court was presented with detailed, unrebutted evidence demonstrating the negative repercussions that would follow the blanket disclosure of SSOSA and SSODA evaluations held by Pierce County, including re-traumatizing victims, hindering offenders from rehabilitation and reintegration, and undermining the success of the SSOSA/SSODA system itself. In light of this evidence, the injunction should be affirmed.

Ms. Zink raises several other issues on appeal—whether the trial court should have allowed Plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym and whether the trial court should have certified a Plaintiff class. Ms. Zink's arguments on these other issues are legally flawed and should be rejected.

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Does RCW 70.02 exempt SSOSA and SSODA evaluations from disclosure under the PRA?

2. Does RCW 13.50 exempt SSODA evaluations from disclosure under the PRA?

3. Did the trial court correctly conclude that blanket disclosure of SSOSA and SSODA evaluations would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably harm the class members?

4. Did the trial court correctly allow Plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym?

5. Was the trial court within its discretion to certify a class of Plaintiffs?

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The SSOSA system.

The SSOSA system is a legislative creation that provides a sentencing alternative for certain first-time sex offenders. *State v. Panel*, 173 Wn.2d 222, 227, 267 P.3d 349 (2011). Under this system, eligible people who are found amenable to treatment must submit to intensive treatment and supervision, RCW 9.94A.670(b)-(d) in exchange for a possible reduction in prison time. RCW 9.94A.670(5)(a).

The rigorous standards laid out by the SSOSA statute ensure that only a few people are even eligible for a SSOSA in the first place; as a result, these types of sentences are rarely imposed. RCW 9.94A.670(2)-

(4). In addition to requiring offenders who are seeking a SSOSA to meet certain threshold eligibility requirements,[2] the system requires a thorough screening evaluation to determine amenability to treatment. The trial court makes its ultimate sentencing determination on the basis of this detailed evaluation. RCW 9.94A.670(3). SSOSA evaluations must be performed by certified treatment providers—i.e., health care professionals who have been specifically licensed by the Department of Health to evaluate and treat people with sex-related behavioral problems. *See* RCW 9.94A.820(1); RCW 18.155.020.

The purpose of the SSOSA evaluation is to assess "the offender's amenability to treatment and relative risk to the community," and to propose a "treatment plan." RCW 9.94A.670(3)(b). To fulfill this purpose, SSOSA evaluations necessarily contain very detailed personal information. They must describe, among other things, the offender's crime; sexual history; perceptions of others; risk factors, including the offender's alcohol and drug abuse, sexual patterns, use of pornography, and social environmental influences; personal history, including the offender's relationships, employment, and education; a family history; a

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[2] To be eligible for a SSOSA, the offense the offender has been convicted of must not be a serious violent offense; the offense must not have resulted in substantial bodily injury to the plaintiff; the offender must not have any prior convictions for a sex offense; and the offender must have had an established relationship with, or connection to, the victim so that the sole connection with the victim was not the offense. RCW 9.94A.670(2)(a)-(f).

history of the offender's violence or criminal behavior; and the offender's mental health functioning. WAC 246-930-320(2)(e). Taking all of these factors into account, the SSOSA evaluation assesses the appropriateness of community treatment, summarizes the examiner's diagnostic impressions, gauges the offender's risk of reoffending, appraises the offender's willingness for outpatient treatment, and proposes a clear and detailed treatment plan. WAC 246-930-320(2)(f)-(g).

The court decides whether to impose a SSOSA only after receiving and reviewing the evaluation. *See* RCW 9.94A.670(4). When the court does decide to impose a SSOSA, the sentence must include certain terms. The sentence, for example, must always include a period of treatment of up to five years. RCW 9.94A.670(5)(c). It must also impose "[s]pecific prohibitions and affirmative conditions" relating to behaviors that may trigger recidivism, such as viewing pornography or using intoxicants. RCW 9.94A.670(5)(d).

B. The SSODA system.

Like the SSOSA system for adults, juveniles (under the age of 18) convicted of a first-time sex offense that is not a serious violent offense (see RCW 9.9A.030) may be eligible for a SSODA sentence.[3] If they

[3] The eligibility requirements for a SSODA for a juvenile are similar to those of a SSOSA and can be found at RCW 13.40.162. At a minimum, to qualify for a SSODA a juvenile

receive a SSODA, they will receive treatment and supervision under the jurisdiction of a County Juvenile Court for no less than 24 months. A significant fact in determining if this alternative is appropriate is a SSODA evaluation that is completed by a Department of Health licensed Certified Sex Offender Treatment Provider. RCW 13.40.162(7)(c). There are a variety of areas that must be addressed in the evaluation as specified in the SSODA statute, RCW 13.40.162, as well as prescribed in the WAC. These evaluations vary from provider to provider but generally contain the following categories of information: summary of sex offense conviction and criminal history; the youth's social history; the youth's education/employment history; the youth's family history, mental health functioning, substance use/abuse history, medical history, and complete sexual history usually verified by a polygraph examination; the youth's summary of risk to reoffend in the community; the appropriateness of receiving a SSODA sentence; a recommended plan of treatment in the community; and recommendations for supervision requirements. See CP 1446.

Like SSOSA evaluations, the ultimate purpose of the SSODA evaluation is "to determine whether the respondent is amenable to

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must be a first-time sex offender and the sex offense the juvenile committed cannot be a serious violent offense. RCW 13.40.162(1).

treatment." *State v. A.G.S.*, 182 Wn.2d 273, 277, 340 P.3d 830 (2014) (citing RCW 13.40.162(2)). The Washington Supreme Court has unequivocally described the SSODA as "a psychological report that includes a treatment plan." *Id.* at 278.

C. Plaintiffs filed this action to enjoin the release of SSOSA/SSODA evaluations after Ms. Zink demanded evaluations from Pierce County under the PRA.

On October 3, 2014, Donna Zink sent a request to Pierce County under the PRA, RCW 42.56. She demanded all SSOSA and SSODA evaluations in the possession of Pierce County, among other records.[4] Soon after, Plaintiff's filed this action to enjoin the mass release of SSOSA and SSODA evaluations. CP 296-97.

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[4] Ms. Zink also requested all registration records of sex offenders and all victim impact statements in the possession of Pierce County. CP 297. At the trial court, Plaintiffs sought and obtained a permanent injunction enjoining Pierce County from releasing the registration records on the grounds that RCW 4.24.550 was an "other statute" that exempted the records from disclosure under the PRA; from releasing SSOSA and SSODA evaluations on the grounds that RCW 70.02 exempted such records; and from releasing SSODA evaluations on the grounds that such records are exempt from disclosure under RCW 13.50. CP 2323-31. (Plaintiffs did not object to the disclosure of the victim impact statements.) Ms. Zink thereafter filed this appeal.

Meanwhile, on April 17, 2015, one of Ms. Zink's other PRA cases, *Doe ex rel. Roe v. Wash. State Patrol*, 185 Wn.2d 363, 374 P.3d 63 (2016)—which also involved the legal questions of whether RCW 4.24.550 exempt registration records of sex offenders from disclosure under the PRA—was argued at the Washington Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals in this case stayed proceedings pending the outcome of that case.

On, April 7, 2016, the Supreme Court decided *Doe ex rel. Roe v. Wash. State Patrol*, holding that the Washington State Patrol was required to release sex offender registration records under the PRA and that RCW 4.24.550 was not an "other statute" prohibiting their release. Because the records in *Doe ex rel. Roe v. Wash. State Patrol* did not include SSOSA or SSODA evaluations, the legal question of whether such records are exempt from disclosure under the PRA was not addressed in that case.

Thus, SSOSA and SSODA evaluations are the only records included in Ms. Zink's original PRA request to Pierce County that remain at issue in this case.

Plaintiffs are current or former level I sex offenders who are either compliant with registration requirements or who were compliant during the time they were subject to registration requirements. Washington differentiates between offenders who present a high, moderate, or low risk for re-offense. *See State v. Brosius*, 154 Wn. App. 714, 720, 225 P.3d 1049 (2010). Level I offenders are those registered sex offenders who have been assessed to pose the lowest risk to the public. RCW 13.40.217(3); RCW 72.09.345(6). Some underwent SSOSA evaluations and successfully completed SSOSA treatment. Others underwent SSODA evaluations and successfully competed SSODA treatment. *See* CP 1452-68.

After filing this action, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, which was granted. CP 968-73. The trial court also allowed plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym and to represent a certified class of compliant level I offenders, many of whom underwent a SSOSA or SSODA evaluation. CP 975-79.

Plaintiffs later moved for summary judgment and a permanent injunction under RCW 42.56.540, the provision of the PRA that authorizes injunctions against disclosure. CP 1280-1300. Plaintiffs argued that RCW 70.02 prohibited the release of SSOSA and SSODA evaluations, and that RCW 13.50 also prohibited the release of SSODA evaluations. CP 1280-

1300. After full briefing and argument, the trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion. CP 2323-32. This appeal followed.

IV. ARGUMENT

Ms. Zink argues that SSOSA and SSODA evaluations are not exempt from disclosure under the PRA. Br. of Appellant, at 89-90. This is incorrect. SSOSA and SSODA evaluations by definition and practice include confidential health care information of patients and are thus explicitly exempt under the PRA.

The PRA is a statutory scheme that provides procedures for the public to inspect and copy public records, but it also provides a number of exemptions to such disclosure. The PRA itself explicitly lays out some of the exemptions to disclosure. *Doe ex rel. Roe v. Wash. State. Patrol*, No. 90413-8, 2016 WL 1458206, at *3 (Wash. Apr. 7, 2016). One of these exemptions is for RCW 70.02, which applies to "public inspection and copying of health care information of patients." RCW 42.56.360(2).

A. RCW 70.02 prohibits Pierce County from releasing SSOSA and SSODA evaluations.

SSOSA and SSODA evaluations are exempt from the PRA because they qualify as exempt "health care information of patients" under RCW 70.02. The PRA explicitly incorporates certain aspects of the UHCIA, RCW 70.02. The PRA states that "[c]hapter 70.02 RCW applies

to public inspection and copying of health care information of patients," thus exempting the "health care information of patients" from the PRA. RCW 42.56.360(2); *see also Prison Legal News, Inc. v. Dep't of Corr.*, 154 Wn.2d 628, 644, 115 P.3d 316 (2005). SSOSA and SSODA evaluations qualify as "health care information of patients."

i. SSOSAs and SSODAs include "health care information"

Under RCW 70.02, "health care information" is defined as "any information, ... recorded in any form or medium, that identifies or can readily be associated with the identity of a patient and directly relates to the patient's health care." RCW 70.02.010(16). SSOSA and SSODA evaluations fit squarely within that definition.

By law SSOSA evaluations can only be performed by certified health care professionals who have been specifically licensed by the Department of Health to evaluate and treat sex offenders. *See* RCW 9.94A.820(1); RCW 18.155.020. These professionals must "possess an underlying credential as a licensed health care professional," and must "have extensive training in a mental health field, as well as specialty training in the evaluation and treatment of sexual offense behavior." CP 1411.

SSOSA evaluations are no different from any other clinical evaluation conducted by a mental health care provider, a fact that is demonstrated and supported by the expert testimony in the record. The Washington Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (WATSA) testified that SSOSA evaluations contain the provider's diagnostic impressions; an assessment of psychological, behavioral, and lifestyle factors; and a written treatment plan. CP 1410. And, critically, "the clinical approach of an evaluator completing a SSOSA evaluation is the same as the clinical approach of an evaluator conducting an intake for a non-criminal justice involved person seeking mental health treatment for a sexual behavior problem." CP 1410.

The statutorily declared purpose of SSOSA evaluations is to determine whether offenders are amenable to treatment. RCW 9.94A.670(3). To determine whether an offender is amenable to treatment for a condition—i.e., amenable to health care—the evaluator must necessarily prepare a medical evaluation of the offender. Such an evaluation is precisely the kind of information that "directly relates to the patient's health care." RCW 70.02.010(16).

ii. An offender undergoing a SSOSA or SSODA qualifies as a "patient."

An offender undergoing a SSOSA evaluation qualifies as a "patient." RCW 42.56.360(2) (exempting health care information "of patients"). A "patient" is defined as "an individual who receives or has received health care." RCW 70.02.010(31). "Heath care" is defined broadly to include "any care, service, or procedure provided by a health care provider" in order to "diagnose, treat, or maintain a patient's physical or mental condition." RCW 70.02.010(14). Only health care providers may perform SSOSA evaluations. RCW 9.94A.820(1); RCW 18.155.020; *see also* RCW 70.02.010(18) (defining "health care provider"). In performing a SSOSA evaluation, the health care provider is providing a service that is intended to "diagnose" and "treat" the offender's condition. In determining whether the offender is amenable to treatment, the health care provider is necessarily diagnosing the individual. *See* RCW 9.94A.670(3) (evaluation is made to "determine whether the offender is amenable to treatment"). And in proposing a treatment plan the health care provider is helping to treat the offender/patient—because an individual cannot be treated without a plan of treatment. RCW 9.94A.670(3)(b).

iii. The Washington Supreme Court has recognized that SSOSA and SSODA evaluations contain mental health care information of patients.

The Supreme Court has recognized that SSOSA evaluations constitute health care information. Recently, in *State v. A.G.S.*, the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he purpose of the SSODA evaluation is 'to determine whether the respondent is amenable to treatment,'" and despite being a mandatory evaluation designed to help a sentencing court a SSODA evaluation is "**not a court document. Rather, it is a psychological report that includes a treatment plan.**"[5] *A.G.S.*, 182 Wn.2d at 277-78 (emphasis added).

Similarly, in *State v. Sanchez*, 177 Wn.2d 835, 306 P.3d (2013), the Supreme Court recognized that SSODA evaluations contain mental health reports and indicated that such evaluations are protected from disclosure by RCW 70.02 and the federal Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA):

> Because his SSODA evaluation contains mental health reports, Sanchez contends that it is protected from disclosure to the sheriff's office by chapter 70.02 RCW and [HIPAA]....
>
> While it is certainly true that chapter 70.02 RCW and HIPAA protect mental health records, *see* RCW

[5] As discussed, SSOSA and SSODA evaluations serve a similar purpose and must include similar content. *Compare* RCW 9.94A.670 (SSOSA) *with* RCW 13.40.162 (SSODA). It is plaintiffs' position that the RCW 70.02 exemption under the PRA applies equally to SSOSA and SSODA evaluations.

> 70.02.010(5)(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4)(b), that protection is conditional. Chapter 70.02 RCW specifically provides for the release of health care information, without authorization by the patient, if "required by law." Similarly, HIPPA permits the release of personally identifying medical information to law enforcement by court order. Therefore, neither HIPAA nor chapter 70.02 RCW applies where a court, acting pursuant to statutory mandate (here, RCW 4.24.550), orders the release of medical information to law enforcement.

Sanchez, 177 Wn.2d at 849 (internal citations omitted). While the statutory mandate to disclose information to law enforcement, RCW 4.24.550(6), overrode RCW 70.02's prohibition on the release of patients' health care information in *Sanchez*, no such mandate applies in this case; therefore, RCW 70.02 and RCW 4.56.360(2) control.

iv. The UHCIA does not permit disclosure of SSOSA or SSODA evaluations under these circumstances.

The UHCIA specifically limits the disclosure of mental health records in Sections .230 through .260. RCW 70.02.230 states:

> Except as provided in this section [and other enumerated sections], the fact of admission to a provider for mental health services and all information and records compiled, obtained, or maintained in the course of providing mental health services to either voluntary or involuntary recipients of services at public or private agencies **must be confidential**.

RCW 70.02.230(1) (emphasis added). RCW 70.02.230 enumerates specific instances where confidential mental health care information may be disclosed without the patient's consent. For example, disclosure is

permitted between qualified professionals who are providing services to the patient or to appropriate law enforcement agencies that need the information to respond to an emergent situation that poses a risk to the public. *See* RCW 70.02.230(2)(a) and (h). Disclosure is also permitted when mandatory under HIPPA. *See* RCW 70.02.230(2)(e). Notably, though, each of these exceptions involves a professional or family member requesting the information for a particular purpose. Nothing in the law gives Pierce County permission to release health records en masse to the general public. RCW 42.56.360(2) (exempting from the PRA information covered by RCW 70.02).

v. The fact that SSOSA and SSODA evaluations help the sentencing court does not mean they are not exempt records.

The fact that SSOSA and SSODA evaluations are mandatory evaluations designed to help a sentencing court does not mean that they do not contain protected "health care information." "[A] SSOSA evaluation serves many important functions," not just one. *Koenig v. Thurston Cty.*, 175 Wn.2d 837, 847, 287 P.3d 523 (2012). Nothing in RCW 70.02 indicates that a document cannot contain health care information just because it also relates to sentencing. While a SSOSA evaluation aids a sentencing court's decision, the court "cannot make this decision without first knowing whether the offender is amenable to treatment." *State v.*

Young, 125 Wn.2d 688, 696, 888 P.3d 142 (1995). And to determine amenability to treatment—specifically **health care** treatment—the evaluator must necessarily perform a health care evaluation. That is why the evaluation is performed by a health care professional, RCW 18.155.020, who employs the same clinical approach that an evaluator would use for any patient "seeking mental health treatment for a sexual behavior problem." CP 1410.

Nor does the fact that SSOSAs and SSODAs are held by law enforcement automatically subject them to disclosure. As discussed, the UHCIA applies to PRA requests, RCW 42.56.360(2). And as RCW 70.02.005 recognizes, "[i]t is the public policy of this state that a patient's interest in proper use and disclosure of the patient's health care information **survives even when the information is held by persons other than health care providers**." RCW 70.02.005(4) (emphasis added). This necessarily includes law enforcement.

In sum, a SSOSA or SSODA evaluation is performed by a health care professional who treats the offender as a patient and employs normal clinical methods to produce an assessment of the offender's condition and formulate a treatment plan. If a SSOSA or SSODA evaluation is not the "health care information" of a "patient" under RCW 70.02, it is difficult to

see what kind of health care information could be exempt from public disclosure.

B. *Koenig* does not Control this Case.

Koenig v. Thurston County, 175 Wn.2d 837, 287 P.3d 523 (2012) does not control the outcome of this case. *Koenig* merely held that SSOSA evaluations do not fall under RCW 42.56.240(1)'s "investigative records" exemption from disclosure. *Koenig*, 175 Wn.2d at 849. *Koenig* cannot be read to dispose of every possible exemption to the PRA, including those Koenig does not discuss. "In cases where a legal theory is not discussed in the opinion, that case is not controlling on a future case where the legal theory is properly raised." *Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 124 Wn.2d 816, 824, 881 P.2d 986 (1994).

The reach of *Koenig* is confirmed by the Court of Appeals' opinion in that case. There, the Court of Appeals held that Thurston County had waived any argument that the UHCIA prohibited disclosure. *Koenig v. Thurston Cty.*, 155 Wn. App. 398, 418, 229 P.3d 910 (2010). It is unsurprising that the Supreme Court did not discuss an argument waived at the Court of Appeals. It is irrelevant that Thurston County or amici discussed the UHCIA in their briefs.

Plaintiffs have never relied upon the investigative records exemption and neither appellate court in *Koenig* addressed whether

SSOSA evaluations are exempt health care records. Thus, *Koenig* does not control here.

C. SSODAs of Plaintiffs are strictly exempt from disclosure under RCW 13.50.

RCW 13.50 is an "other statute" that specifically exempts SSODA evaluations from the PRA under RCW 42.56.070(1). *Deer v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.*, 122 Wn. App. 84, 91, 93 P.3d 195 (2004); A.G.S., 182 Wn.2d at 278-80.

Washington classifies records pertaining to a juvenile's criminal offense into three categories: (a) the official juvenile court file, which includes court filings, findings, orders, and the like; (b) the "social file," which contains reports of the probation counselor; and (c) other miscellaneous records. RCW 13.50.010(1); *A.G.S.*, 182 Wn.2d at 278-80. And "all juvenile records are by default confidential unless they are part of the official juvenile court file or a particular statutory exemption apples." *A.G.S.*, 182 Wn.2d at 278.

In *State v. A.G.S.*, the Washington Supreme Court addressed the following question: "Are SSODA evaluations part of the official juvenile court file? If not, they must be kept confidential...." *Id.* The *A.G.S.* Court determined that SSODAs are not part of the official juvenile court file

because, "[p]ut simply, [a SSODA] is not a court document. Rather, it is a psychological report that includes a treatment plan." *Id.*

The *A.G.S. Court* also discussed the sensitive nature of SSODA evaluations, given the juvenile status of the offenders:

> This court has already recognized that the "SSODA evaluation may contain sensitive, privileged, or embarrassing information, including details regarding a juvenile's social situation or alleged deviant behaviors." *State v. Sanchez*, 177 Wash.2d 835, 846, 306 P.3d 935 (2013). Holding that the SSODA evaluation belongs in the official juvenile court file means that it is open to the public. RCW 13.50.050(2). We have recognized that "indiscriminately releasing such an evaluation to the public, or to an agency without need or authority to review it, could raise legitimate privacy concerns." *Sanchez*, 177 Wash.2d at 846. Because the SSODA evaluation also contains multiple descriptions of the offenses, RCW 13.40.162(2)(a)(i), it could also contain extremely sensitive information regarding the victims. Making the SSODA evaluation automatically open to the public is contrary to the legislative intent expressed in RCW 13.50.050(3), which provides that all records other than the court file are confidential.

Id. at 279.

Thus, Washington courts have unambiguously determined that RCW 13.50 is an "other statute" that exempts confidential juvenile records from the PRA. Disclosure of SSODA evaluations to a member of the general public such as Ms. Zink would clearly violate RCW 13.50.050, public policy, and is not required by the PRA.

In addition to the clear statutory mandate to protect SSODA evaluations from public disclosure, public policy favors the protection of such documents. As the uncontested expert testimony in this case demonstrates, "[a]dult and juvenile sex offenders are different.... The impacts are different for juveniles than the adult population though neurological and social science." CP 1443. "[T]here is a significant number of the level 1 juvenile offender population with adjudicated sex offense behavior that occurred at very young ages, with the highest frequency occurring between the ages of 12-15...." CP 1443-44. "The release of [SSODA] evaluations would likely negatively impact a variety of known risk factors, which may ultimately increase their risk for participating in future criminal behavior," as well as re-victimizing victims of sexual offenses. CP 1446-47. In short, the release of SSODA evaluations for youth supervised by the juvenile courts, who are generally the lowest risk juvenile sex offenders in the state, would violate a variety of statute and cause significant harm to impacted youth, their families, and victims. *See* CP 1448.

D. The Trial Court Properly Enjoined Pierce County from Releasing SSOSA and SSODA evaluations to Ms. Zink.

Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against disclosure under RCW 42.56.540. Under that statute, a court may issue an injunction if it

finds (1) that the record names or specifically pertains to the party seeking an injunction; (2) that an exemption against disclosure applies; and (3) that "disclosure would not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably harm [the complaining] party or a vital government function." *Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Att'y Gen.*, 177 Wn.2d 467, 487, 300 P.3d 799 (2013) (citing RCW 42.56.540). The trial court found that Plaintiffs had satisfied all of these requirements. CP 2323-32.

i. Detailed, unrebutted testimony supports the trial court's findings that SSOSA and SSODA evaluations contain health care information and that disclosure would substantially and irreparably harm the class members.

The trial court found that "SSOSA and SSODA require the offender to disclose highly sensitive personal and medical information," "are conducted by certified mental health professionals," and that "Plaintiffs submitted undisputed evidence that SSOSA and SSODA evaluations are mental health records." CP 2324, 2326.

The court also found that "Plaintiffs submitted detailed declarations, from the individual Plaintiffs and third parties, attesting to the harm caused by public disclosure of the Requested Records" and that "these declarations [are] credible and compelling evidence of the irreparable harm that will result from blanket or generalized disclosure of the Requested Records." CP 2326. Finally, the court found that "[t]he

evidence submitted indicates that sex offenders who are identified to the public through a blanket public disclosure face mental and emotional damages associated with the stigma of the disclosure, and may face physical violence"; that "[i]f Defendants release the requested records ... the Level I sex offenders will find it significantly more difficult to find employment and housing"; and that "[t]heir families, sometimes including the victims, face harassment and ostracism." CP 2326. Ms. Zink challenges these findings. Ms. Zink's challenge fails.

Plaintiffs submitted testimony of experts—whose expertise no party has challenged as inadmissible under ER 702—explaining why SSOSA and SSODA evaluations contain medical, mental health, and other personal information, along with the evaluator's diagnostic assessment of that information. No party submitted evidence rebutting the experts' testimony on this point. And the testimony is both detailed and particularized.

For example, the Plaintiffs submitted testimony from Brad Meryhew, an attorney who is a member of the Sex Offender Policy Board (SOPB) and who has represented hundreds of sex offenders over a distinguished career. CP 1381-94. Based on his expertise, he testified that SSOSA evaluations "include not only an offender's history and details about their crime, but also intimate details about an offender's entire life,"

such as "past sexual partners, victims and non-victims, and the details of their sexual activities." CP 1386. They "also include the intimate details of an offender's marriage or significant relationships." CP 1386.

Plaintiffs submitted similar particularized testimony from WATSA, through its experts, *see* CP 1406-09, explaining that SSOSA evaluations

> include a personal history (including a psychosexual history), an assessment of current functioning, a mental health diagnosis (when indicated, and a proposed set of treatment goals.... SSOSA evaluations must contain the [evaluator's] written conclusions and recommendations, which shall include a summary of the evaluator's diagnostic impressions, specific assessments of risk factors, willingness of the offender to engage in outpatient treatment, and a written treatment plan....

CP 1410. Plaintiffs also submitted testimony from John Clayton, Assistant Secretary of the Juvenile Justice and Rehabilitation Administration, a division of the Department of Social and Health Services, who explained that "[r]elease of SSODA evaluations for youth supervised by the juvenile courts, and who are generally the lowest risk juvenile sex offenders in the state would violate a variety of statutes and cause significant harm to impacted youth, their families, and victims. Release of any of this information would impact known risk factors in a negative way." CP 1448.

Plaintiffs themselves corroborated this expert testimony. One Plaintiff testified that his SSOSA evaluation

> was exhaustive and I was shocked by how personal it was. We went into great detail into my background and family history. We also talked about all my past intimate relationships with women, including with my wife at the time.... I did not think my evaluation records would be public.

CP 1452-53. Another plaintiff testified that

> [t]o do the [SSOSA] evaluation, I met with a psychologist and went over hundreds of exhaustive questions. I was required to disclose my entire sexual history, family history, medical history, and information about by use of drugs and alcohol. The whole thing was very personal. I had to name every sexual partner I'd ever had.

CP 1466. Yet another plaintiff testified that during the SSODA evaluation

> [I] talked about my sexual preferences, the offense and the victim, my medical history and mental health and my family history. The evaluation was personal information, but even being young, I knew at the time that the questions were important and it was important to answer them. I was so young, but I knew that I had done something wrong and talking to the treatment provider would help me fix the situation and help me deal with these problems. If I knew that the information could be broadcast to the public, I'm not sure I could have answered the questions completely.

CP 1457.

This testimony from both expert and fact witnesses is detailed and unrebutted. The trial court did not err by accepting it.

ii. Detailed, unrebutted testimony supports the trial court's finding that release of SSOSA/SSODA evaluations would not be in the public's interest.

The trial court made the following finding:

> Blanket or generalized release of the Requested Records of Class members would make it more difficult for Level I offenders to safely integrate into their communities, and might deter individuals from seeking treatment or providing sensitive information for effective treatment. Disclosure would thus undermine the legislature's purpose of creating the SSOSA and SSODA, and jeopardize the success of those who receive SSOSAs and SSODAs.

CP 2326-27. This finding was based on substantial evidence. Plaintiffs submitted concrete evidence showing that mass disclosure of SSOSA and SSODA evaluations would injure the public interest because it would (i) discourage offenders from seeking evaluations, or from being candid with their evaluators; (ii) re-traumatize victims; and (iii) disclose sensitive health information.

a. *Disclosure would discourage offenders from seeking evaluations, and from being candid with their evaluators.*

The public has an interest in the proper operation of the SSOSA system. *See Koenig*, 175 Wn.2d at 847 ("We do not doubt the value of SSOSA evaluations. Indeed, we have recognized that the legislature developed this sentencing alternative for first time offenders to prevent future crimes and protect society."). Experts who have represented sex offenders in the SSOSA/SSODA process testified that

> general public disclosure of very intimate, personal details about themselves, their family, and all of their past sexual partners will undoubtedly lead many offenders to refuse to participate in valuation and assessment, and will lead others to offer less than complete information. This erosion of the quality of information available to the courts, treatment providers, corrections, and law enforcement will negatively affect public safety.

CP 1390. WATSA also testified that

> if an exception is made [to RCW 70.02 and HIPAA] for SSOSA treatment records and these become subject to public disclosure, this could significantly and negatively impact our ability to meaningfully engage offenders in the treatment process. It is further our position that by deterring meaningful participation in SSOSA treatment, release of these mental health records to the public would ultimately result in an increased – not decreased – risk to the community.

CP 1412.

The testimony on which the trial court relied consisted of expert predictions rationally based on past experience and unrebutted by countervailing testimony.

b. *Disclosure would re-traumatize victims.*

The public has an interest in not re-traumatizing victims of sex offenses by exposing them to the public. *See, e.g.*, *State v. Kalakosky*, 121 Wn.2d 525, 547, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993) (noting that sexual assault victims need privacy in order to successfully recover, and observing that "[o]f recent years, legislatures and courts have attempted to provide rape victims some privacy rights"). The record supports that mass disclosure of

SSOSA and SSODA evaluations would re-traumatize a substantial number of victims.

SSOSA and SSODA evaluations contain sensitive information about not just the offenders themselves, but also their victims. CP 1387, 1448. The victim's identity will often be obvious from a SSOSA evaluation; disclosure of the SSOSA evaluation will thus disclose their identity and re-traumatize them. CP 1387, 1391-92 ("The disclosure of a relative perpetrator for example almost inevitably leads to the person they victimized being disclosed as the victim."); *see also* CP 1448.

c. *Disclosure would expose sensitive health care information.*

The public has an interest in preserving the confidentiality of sensitive health care information. *See Planned Parenthood of the Great NW v. Bloedow*, 187 Wn. App. 606, 628, 350 P.3d 660 (2015). As discussed in detail above, mass disclosure of SSOSA and SSODA evaluations would release sensitive health care information.

E. The Trial Court Properly Allowed Plaintiffs to Proceed in Pseudonym.

Without sealing court filings from public access, the trial court allowed Plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym. CP 979-81. Ms. Zink challenges this decision as an improper order to seal. This is incorrect; there was no improper order to seal. The Court should affirm the trial

court's decision under well-established principles governing pseudonymity.[6]

i. By allowing Plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym, the trial court was not sealing documents.

GR 15 defines what it means to seal a document. "To seal," the rules says, "means to protect from examination by the public and unauthorized court personnel." GR 15(b)(4). An order to redact "shall be treated as ... [an] order to seal," and to redact means to protect "a portion or portions of a specified court record" from "examination by the public and unauthorized court personnel." GR 15(b)(4), (5).

Under GR 15, then, a court filing is sealed or redacted when the filing, or portions of it, are available to the court, but not available to the public. Here, though, everything available to the trial court was also available to the public.

Washington precedents on sealing also suggest that pseudonymous litigation does not amount to sealing. In adopting a presumption against sealing, for example, our Supreme Court relied on the public's "right of access to court proceedings" under the Washington Constitution. *Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa*, 97 Wn.2d 30, 36, 640 P.2d 716 (1982). "[T]o maintain public confidence in the fairness and honesty of the judicial

[6] Appellate courts review for an abuse of discretion orders granting leave to proceed anonymously. *See Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp.*, 214 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000).

branch," the public has a right "to access open courts where they may freely observe the administration of civil and criminal justice." *Rufer v. Abbott Labs.*, 154 Wn.2d 530, 542, 114 P.3d 1182 (2005). As the Supreme Court, quoting a trial court, has observed, the public presumptively has access to "[e]verything that passes before this Court." *Id.*

Here, allowing Plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym did not abridge the public's right to access anything that passed before the trial court. It did not deprive the public of any information that the trial court possessed or prevent the public from scrutinizing the trial court's decisions.

Plaintiffs' names, therefore, resemble the "information surfacing during pretrial discovery that does not otherwise come before the court. *Rufer*, 154 Wn.2d at 541. Because that information "does not become part of the court's decision making process," the public's rights that apply to court filings "do[ ] not speak to its disclosure." *Dreiling v. Jain*, 151 Wn.2d 900, 910, 93 P.3d 861 (2004). Thus, "there is not yet a public right of access with respect to these materials," and only "good cause" need be shown before those materials may be restricted. *Rufer*, 154 Wn.2d at 541. Here, as explained below, Plaintiffs showed good cause for proceeding in pseudonym.[7]

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[7] Ms. Zink recently asked the Supreme Court to rule that the same rules governing orders to seal also governed orders allowing litigants to proceed in pseudonym. The Supreme

ii. The court acted within its discretion when it allowed Plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym.

While CR 10(a)(1) provides that complaints "shall include the name of all the parties," it is silent about whether parties must use names that identify the individual, especially in cases where the individual is seeking to protect against the disclosure of their identity. Our Supreme Court, has said in passing that "a plaintiff may proceed under a pseudonym to protect a privacy interest." *N. Am. Council on Adoptable Children v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.*, 108 Wn.2d 433, 440, 739 P.2d 677 (1987). The federal courts, whose Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) is materially identical in relevant part to CR 10(a)(1), have come to the same conclusion. *See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant*, 537 F.3d 185, 189 (2nd Cir. 2008) (citing cases); *Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp.*, 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). These federal courts have identified many factors that may be considered when a court exercises its discretion to permit proceeding in pseudonym—cautioning always, though, that any list is "non-exhaustive" and that courts should take into account other factors relevant to the particular case at hand.[8] *Sealed Plaintiff*, 537 F.3d at 189-90.

Court did not reach this issue and declined to express an opinion on it. *Doe ex rel. Roe v. Wash. State Patrol*, 185 Wn.2d 363, 385 & n.6, 374 P.3d 63 (2016).

[8] Because no appellate case law in Washington speaks to when and how parties may proceed in pseudonym, Plaintiff's rely here on persuasive federal authorities.

The trial court recognized that only by proceeding in pseudonym could Plaintiffs have meaningful access to injunctive relief. It stated: "Plaintiffs seek to exercise their right, under the Public Records Act ("PRA"), to enjoin release of personally identifying information which they contend is exempt from the PRA. Forcing Plaintiffs to disclose their identities to bring this action would eviscerate the ability to seek relief." CP 980. In so finding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Courts agree that use of pseudonyms is appropriate when "the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity." *See M.M. v. Zavaras*, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998). Here, as the trial court noted, the very harm that Plaintiffs sought to prevent in bringing this action would have been realized if the trial court had forced Plaintiffs to publicly disclose their identities. *See Doe v. Harris*, 640 F.3d 972, 973 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing Plaintiff "to continue to proceed under a pseudonym because drawing public attention to his status as a sex offender is precisely the consequence he seeks to avoid by bringing this suit"); *Roe v. Ingraham*, 364 F. Supp. 536, 541 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (permitting plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym in challenging the constitutionality of a statute requiring disclosure of their identities as individuals prescribed narcotic drugs). It would also have undermined the PRA itself, which permits challenges to the release of

records by individuals named in the records. *See* RCW 42.56.540. Indeed, forcing Plaintiffs to disclose their identities to access the only relief available—court protection of exempt records—would have raised serious due process concerns. *Cf. Bodie v. Connecticut*, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (recognizing a due process right to access to the courts when judicial review is necessary to resolve a dispute).

The trial court determined that disclosing Plaintiffs' identities would cause them permanent harm and that the Plaintiffs faced "a significant risk of physical, mental, economic, and emotional harm if their identities are disclosed." CP 980. This determination is correct.

Like the trial court here, other courts have allowed anonymity for plaintiffs "when identification creates a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm" and "when anonymity is necessary to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature." *Does I Thru XXIII*, 214 F.3d at 1068. Courts have permitted the use of pseudonyms by individuals who receive mental health treatment when the case would necessarily reveal their illness or treatment. *See, e.g., Doe v. Colautti*, 592 F.2d 704, 705 (3rd Cir. 1979) (pseudonym used by plaintiff challenging state benefits for hospitalization in private mental institutions); *Doe v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co.*, 237 F.R.D. 545, 549-50 (D.N.J. 2006) (collecting and

discussing cases). Additionally, courts have allowed parties to proceed in pseudonym "when nondisclosure of the party's identity is necessary to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment." *Does I Thru XXIII*, 214 F.3d at 1067-68.

These factors are present here. Plaintiffs and experts familiar with the treatment of sexual offenders testified by declaration that if Plaintiffs were publicly identified as registered sex offenders they would face physical and verbal abuse, harassment, economic loss, and psychological harm. CP 1383-94. Experts in the treatment of sexual offenders also testified that broad-based dissemination of mental health treatment records will undermine the efficacy of the treatment process. *Id.* The trial court did not abuse its discretion by agreeing with this testimony.

The trial court also recognized that "the public's right to access the proceedings will not be compromised apart from its ability to ascertain the names of individual Plaintiffs" and that "[t]he names of the individual Plaintiffs have little bearing on the public's interest in the dispute or its resolution." CP 980. In so reasoning, the trial court did not abuse its discretion: "[W]here a lawsuit is brought solely against the government and seeks to raise an abstract question of law that affects many similarly situated individuals, the identities of the particular parties bringing suit may be largely irrelevant to the public concern with the nature of the

process." *See Doe v. Del Rio*, 241 F.R.D. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The primary questions in this case are legal questions of statutory interpretation that affect hundreds, if not thousands, of people that are similarly situated to the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs represent a certified class of those people. Under these circumstances, the precise names of the named Plaintiffs have little bearing on the public's interest in this case.

The trial court also did not abuse its discretion when it found that Pierce County and Ms. Zink would not be prejudiced by allowing Plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym. CP 980. Neither Pierce County nor Ms. Zink challenged the Plaintiff's existence or credibility.

Next, the trial court was within its discretion to find that Plaintiffs' privacy interests in proceeding in pseudonym outweighed the public's interest in their identity. CP 980. The public's access to the case was no limited apart from being unable to determine the identities of Plaintiffs. And, as noted above, the Plaintiff's identities are largely irrelevant. Thus, the public's minimal interest in learning Plaintiff's names is outweighed by Plaintiff's interest in meaningful access to judicial review and in avoiding harm to themselves and their loved ones.

Finally, the trial court found that "[p]ermitting Plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym is the least restrictive means to protect their interests" and that "no other reasonably alternative exists." CP 980. The trial court's

finding on this was not an abuse of discretion, particularly as Ms. Zink has suggested no alternative that could protect Plaintiffs' interests.

F. The Trial Court Acted Well Within its Discretion by Certifying a Class.

The trial court certified a Plaintiff class defined as:

> All individuals named in registration forms, a registration database, SSOSA evaluations, or SSODA evaluations in the possession of Pierce County, and classified as sex offenders at risk level I who are compliant with the conditions of registration.

CP 975. Ms. Zink challenges this class certification. She does not argue that the trial court misapplied CR 23. Rather, she argues that the PRA forecloses class actions altogether. According to Zink, each "person who is named in the record or to whom the record pertains," RCW 42.56.540, must be joined as a party. This argument should be rejected. It conflicts with the civil rules and binding precedent interpreting those rules, and it also misunderstands the nature of class actions.

Because Ms. Zink does not deny that CR 23 itself allows class certification in this case, the trial court's certification decision should be affirmed. After all, "[c]lass certification is governed by CR 23." *Moeller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash.*, 173 Wn.2d 264, 278, 267 P.3d 998 (2011). And civil rules like CR 23 "govern all civil proceedings" except when they are "inconsistent with rules or statutes applicable to special proceedings." CR 81(a). The PRA, however is not one of those "statutes

applicable to special proceedings." As the Supreme Court has held, the PRA does "not create a special proceeding subject to special rules," so "the normal civil rules are appropriate for prosecuting a PRA claim." *Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane Cty. v. Cty. of Spokane*, 172 Wn.2d 702, 716, 261 P.3d 119 (2011). Thus, CR 23 controls here, and under CR 23 certification was appropriate.

More fundamentally, Ms. Zink's argument misunderstands the representative nature of class actions. In a class action, representative plaintiffs stand in for all the other members of the class. Those members are then treated as parties to the litigation. *See Califano v. Yamasaki*, 442 U.S. 682. 700-01, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (class actions are "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of individual named parties only," and holding that a class action could be maintained even under a statute that referred merely to an "individual"). That is why a class-action judgment binds all unexcluded members of the class. CR 23(c)(3). And that is why moving for class action certification on appeal "amounts, in effect, to a request for a substitution of parties." *Defunis v. Odegaard*, 84 Wn.2d 617, 623, 529 P.2d 438 (1974).

The representative nature of class actions also means that even a statute phrased in individual terms will allow for a class action. So, for

example, even though the Consumer Protection Act authorizes money damages and injunctive relief only to those who "bring a civil action," RCW 19.86.090, the Court of Appeals has held that this provision applies not only to the named plaintiffs, but "to the represented class members" too. *Smith v. Behr Process Corp.*, 113 Wn. App. 306, 346, 54 P.3d 665 (2002). Even though those class members did not bring the action at first, they are deemed to be present as parties through the class-action mechanism.

For the same reason, the PRA does not forbid class actions. Through CR 23, class representatives stand in for all other class members "named in [a] record or to whom [a] record specifically pertains." RCW 42.56.540. If the class representatives' "motion and affidavit[s]" supply proof that records name or specifically pertain to both the class representatives and the other members of the class, *id.*, then a class-wide injunction under RCW 42.56.540 is perfectly acceptable. Because Plaintiffs supplied precisely that proof here, the trial court's class certification and class-wide injunction was proper.

G. Ms. Zink's remaining arguments are not grounded in law and should be rejected.

Finally, Ms. Zink makes several arguments that are not grounded in law and should be rejected. First, Ms. Zink argues that SSOSA

evaluations are required to be open and available to the public pursuant to RCW 9.94A.475 and .480(1). Br. of Appellant, pp. 90-93. This is incorrect. RCW 9.94A.475 states that for certain felonies, "all recommended sentencing agreements or plea agreements and the sentences for [ ] felony crimes shall be made and retained as public records," (emphasis added) not all documents recommending a particular sentencing alternative or disposition. As Brad Merryhew, a member of the SOFB, describes, a SSOSA or SSODA evaluations does not always result in a SSOSA or SSODA sentence. Instead, the number of sex offenders meeting the requirements for SSOSA sentencing has declined from approximately 40% to 15% between 1986 and 2004. CP 1388-89. The courts have recognized this distinction as well: *Koenig* describes the SSOSA not as a sentencing agreement but as "a basis for the court to impose sentencing alternatives." *Koenig*, 175 Wn.2d at 849. Further, the Sentencing Reform Act contains standards "solely for the guidance of prosecutors" and may not be relied upon to create any enforceable rights." RCW 9.94A.401.

Second, Ms. Zink argues that SSOSA and SSODA evaluations are "conviction records" that must be available to the public without restriction under RCW 10.97.050(1). Br. of Appellant, p. 91. This is also incorrect. The Criminal Records Privacy Act, as its name suggests, was

enacted with the express policy of providing for the "completeness, accuracy, confidentiality and security of criminal history record information." SSOSA and SSODA evaluations are much broader than the narrow definition of "conviction record" as it is defined by RCW 10.97.030. Conviction records are basically rap sheets, containing only the name, arrest information and disposition of the arrest if it led to a conviction. RCW 10.97.030(3). The detailed and highly personal information contained in SSOSA and SSODA evaluations is not "criminal history record information relating to an incident which has led to a conviction or other disposition adverse to the subject." RCW 10.97.030(3) (definition of conviction record).

V. CONCLUSION

The trial court's class certification and order allowing Plaintiffs to proceed in pseudonym, and the trial court's summary judgment permanent injunction orders regarding SSOSA and SSODA evaluations, should be affirmed.

Dated this 31st day of October, 2016.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Karen Heaney, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that I served the attached Response via email on the following:

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DATED this 31st day of October, 2016 at Tacoma, Washington.

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